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Abstract. Security of currently deployed public key cryptography algorithms is
foreseen to be vulnerable against quantum computer attacks. Hence, a community
effort exists to develop post-quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms, i.e., algorithms
that are resistant to quantum attacks. In this work, we have investigated how lattice-
based candidate algorithms from the NIST PQC standardization competition fare
when conceived as hardware accelerators. To achieve this, we have assessed the
reference implementations of selected algorithms with the goal of identifying what are
their basic building blocks. We assume the hardware accelerators will be implemented
in application specific integrated circuit (ASIC) and the targeted technology in our
experiments is a commercial 65nm node. In order to estimate the characteristics
of each algorithm, we have assessed their memory requirements, use of multipliers,
and how each algorithm employs hashing functions. Furthermore, for these building
blocks, we have collected area and power figures for 12 candidate algorithms. For
memories, we make use of a commercial memory compiler. For logic, we make use
of a standard cell library. In order to compare the candidate algorithms fairly, we
select a reference frequency of operation of 500MHz. Our results reveal that our
area and power numbers are comparable to the state of the art, despite targeting a
higher frequency of operation and a higher security level in our experiments. The
comprehensive investigation of lattice-based NIST PQC algorithms performed in
this paper can be used for guiding ASIC designers when selecting an appropriate
algorithm while respecting requirements and design constraints.
Keywords: Post-quantum cryptography · NIST PQC algorithms · crypto-hardware ·
ASIC crypto accelerators
1 Introduction
This is an era of internet-of-things (IoT), where all electronic devices around us, small and
big, are connected to the internet, and hence, are vulnerable to an array of security threats.
The backbone technology ensuring that sensitive data can be transmitted over an unsecured
public channel is cryptography. Generally, it has two distinct flavours, i.e., private key
and public key cryptography. Over the last few decades, public key cryptography (PKC)
has become a fundamental security protocol for all forms of digital communication, both
wired and wireless. It involves three main cryptographic operations, namely (1) public
key-encryption/encapsulation (PKE), (2) key-exchange, and (3) digital signatures (DSA)
[1]. When performing these cryptographic operations, the security strength of currently
deployed public key algorithms (e.g., RSA or Elliptic Curve Cryptography) is based on
the difficulty of solving integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems. However,
it has been showed that quantum computers can factorize integers in polynomial time –
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the consequence being that traditional PKC algorithms may become vulnerable [2]. Thus,
to keep security of current communication practices, crypto researchers and developers
are investigating different cryptographic âĂĲhard problemsâĂİ (e.g., isogeny, lattices,
multivariates etc.), in order to develop new algorithms that are robust against quantum
computers.
Towards assessing different cryptographic methods against quantum attacks, the ongoing
NIST post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standardization process serves as a beacon for
the security community. In this text, we refer to algorithms participating in the process as
candidates in a contest. Each candidate in the ongoing NIST contest implements one of
two functions: (1) digital signature or (2) key encapsulation mechanism (KEM). At the onset
of the contest, 82 algorithms were submitted for the standardization process. Based on the
minimum acceptability criteria defined by NIST, 69 algorithms were considered for the first
round. Considering several parameters (i.e., security, cost, performance, implementation
characteristics, etc.), 43 and 11 algorithms were excluded at the completion of first and
second rounds, respectively, while the remaining 15 algorithms were kept for third round [3].
The algorithms that remained in the second round can be categorized into five different
cryptographic hard problems: (a) isogeny-based (1 algorithm), (b) lattice-based (12
algorithms), (c) code-based (7 algorithms), (d) multivariate polynomial cryptography
(4 algorithms) and (e) hash-based digital signatures (2 algorithms) [3, 4]. The security
hardness of lattice-based cryptographic algorithms depends on solving the shortest vector
problem (SVP), i.e., breaking an algorithm is the equivalent of solving the shortest vector
problem [5]. Generally, the lattices are objects in an n-dimensional Euclidean space
characterized by a regular arrangement of points, for complete mathematical formulations
and constructions, interested readers can consult [5–7].
A number of mathematical problems can be used to construct lattice-based schemes.
However, the most commonly used mathematical problems are learning with errors (LWE)
and learning with rounding (LWR). The LWE scheme is based on finding a vector s when
given a matrix A and a vector b = As+ e, where e is a small error vector [6]. On the
other hand, the LWR problem is a variant of learning with errors where one replaces
random errors with deterministic rounding [7].
The following algorithms rely on the LWE problem: NTRU-Prime [8], FrodoKEM [9],
NewHope [10], Crystals-KYBER [11], ThreeBears [12], LAC [13], NTRU [14], qTesla [15]
and Falcon [16]. The LWR problem, on the other hand, is considered in Round5 [17]
and Saber [18] algorithms. Finally, another popular mathematical problem to construct
lattice-based scheme includes short vectors in lattices, as used in the Crystals-Dilithium
[19] algorithm. The aforementioned twelve algorithms were part of the NIST PQC
standardization process and are the objects of this study.
Security is the primary evaluation criterion driving the NIST PQC competition and –
understandably – the software implementations of the candidates focus on it. However,
once the standardization process is over, the selected candidate(s) will surely be considered
for hardware acceleration. In this scenario, a circuit designer will be tasked to improve
performance, reduce area footprint, and reduce power consumption. Being so, it is
imperative that we understand the constraints and characteristics of the algorithms when
implemented as application specific integrated circuits (ASICs) such that we can then judge
their feasibility of implementation for resource-constrained application domains. This is the
main ambition of this work. It is important to highlight that 15 algorithms were selected
(as finalists and alternate candidates) in the ongoing round 3 of the NIST PQC competition.
Out of these 15 selected algorithms, 7 of them are lattice-based. Consequently, we focus
on lattice-based candidates as these are numerous and allow for richer comparisons.
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1.1 Existing studies and identified challenges
Generally speaking, the last few years have brought a tremendous increase in the litera-
ture covering performance evaluations/comparisons of lattice-based cryptography. The
algorithms considered in NIST’s standardization process have received a fair share of the
attention and have been implemented in different platforms [20–29] (i.e., purely software,
SW/HW co-design, FPGA, and ASIC). However, there are several shortcomings to these
studies, even before we consider the specific challenges of ASIC implementation.
Software-based implementations [20, 21]. An evaluation study that focuses on
the energy efficiency of software implementations is provided in [20]. A power analysis on
software implementations of NTRU-Prime algorithm is presented in [21]. However, it must
be emphasized that drawing power or energy figures from software implementations is not
necessarily representative of what an ASIC implementation would eventually consume.
FPGA-based implementations [22–25]. Leveraging high level synthesis (HLS),
Verilog/VHDL codes are generated by the authors of [22,23] through which they evaluate
different design characteristics (i.e., area, clock frequency, and number of cycles required
for the overall computation). FPGA-specific Verilog code were written by the authors
of [24, 25]. The Xilinx Artix-7 FPGA has often been used as a benchmarking platform
for FPGA-based implementations. Therefore, in [22], qTesla and Crystals-Dilithium
are evaluated on an Artix-7 device for key-pair generation, signature generation, and
signature verification. An implementation and comparison study of few of the lattice-based
algorithms is provided in [23], where a Zynq UltraScale system-on-chip (SoC) platform has
been utilized. An FPGA implementation of qTesla hash algorithm on Artix-7 is discussed
in [24]. In [25], an efficient architecture for NewHope is presented using a low-complexity
Number Theoretic Transformation (NTT)/inverse NTT based modular multiplications.
ASIC-based implementations [26–29]. Similar to FPGA-based implementations,
Verilog/VHDL codes are generated through HLS by the authors of [26, 27] where they
evaluate different design characteristics (i.e., area, clock frequency, and number of cycles
required for the overall computation). Instead of describing dedicated cryptocores, solutions
that make use of a RISC-V microprocessor are described in [28, 29]. Still referring to [26],
while ASIC-specific discussion and results over 65nm standard cell library are reported for
seven lattice-based algorithms (Saber, Crystals-KYBER, NewHope, FrodoKEM, NTRU,
Crystals-Dilithium, and qTesla), there is no discussion on memories or multipliers (most
likely abstracted by the use of HLS). We believe these are essential characteristics to
be assessed and have carefully discussed both at length in this study. A design-space
exploration of key generation, signature generation, and signature verification components
of two digital signature algorithms (qTesla and Crystals-Dilithium) is presented in [27]
where the authors also make use of a 65nm standard cell library in their results. However,
from the analysis of only two algorithms, it is hard to draw conclusions on their relative
performance when compared to the many others.
A configurable crypto-processor for post-quantum lattice-based protocols referred to as
Sapphire has been presented in [28], where the authors developed a dedicated instruction
set, an arithmetic logical unit (ALU), and a control unit that interface with data and
instruction memory. Moreover, the Sapphire processor was integrated with a RISC-V
microprocessor to demonstrate FrodoKEM, NewHope, qTesla, Crystals-Kyber and Crystals-
Dilithium algorithms. Similarly, an integrated domain-specific vector co-processor for post
quantum cryptography algorithms with RISC-V microprocessor has been presented in [29].
In summary, there is a real need for a study that systematically compares a large
array of lattice-based PQC algorithms in the fairest manner possible. Our approach to
address this problem is to compare all algorithms that were part of the second round of the
NIST PQC competition and to perform this analysis by breaking down the algorithms into
basic building blocks: memories, multipliers, and hashing cores. We opt not to make use
of HLS in our study since HLS still is more convenient for FPGA-based implementations
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where BRAMs can be easily inferred. In ASICs, this method still presents some enormous
challenges as the tools have no direct interface to proprietary memory compilers. This
being said, we present our contributions in the next subsection.
1.2 Our contributions
The key contribution of this work is to provide a systematic study to investigate the required
hardware resources for implementing PQC algorithms as ASIC hardware accelerators. We
virtually conducted a competition within the NIST competition, albeit focusing only on
lattice-based candidates.
Each algorithm submitted to the NIST PQC competition contains a set of building
blocks and functions (e.g., arithmetic operators, logical operators, memory instances,
transformations from one domain representation to another, etc.). These building blocks
are not standardized as authors have the freedom to implement their C/C++ reference
models in different ways. Therefore, we have defined a set of rules to fairly assess each
reference implementation. By doing so, we define the essential building blocks of each
algorithm in a consistent and fair fashion. Based on the defined principles, we have
evaluated the reference implementations of the studied algorithms to (1) estimate the
required memory sizes, (2) identify large arithmetic operators (i.e., multipliers) and (3) to
identify the utilized hashing functions.
We proceed to compare the algorithms by making an ASIC-specific assessment using
proprietary memory compilers and commercial standard cell libraries. The estimated area
and power for ROMs and RAMs are calculated using memory compilers provided by a
partner foundry. The target technology is 65nm bulk CMOS with a âĂĲlow-powerâĂİ
flavor. Amongst the identified arithmetic operators, we focus on the multipliers as they
are often large and a bottleneck for the performance. Therefore, to calculate the actual
hardware costs, we have developed Verilog RTL models for the multipliers and synthesized
several variants of them using a commercial standard cell library. Furthermore, we have
shown performance trends for different multiplier architectures over different input operand
lengths (21 to 212) in terms of power, area, and clock frequency. From these results, we
then elect a single architecture for fair comparison among candidate algorithms.
Finally, we compile results for the combined memory and logic footprints of each
studied algorithm. We provide the same result for power by utilizing a target frequency of
500MHz for all candidates. This is the information that we believe is the most useful for
ASIC designers when selecting a PQC candidate to implement.
Our paper is organized as follows: a research protocol is defined in Section 2 to assess
the reference implementations of selected algorithms. The characteristics of each assessed
algorithm are described in Section 3, where we identify memory instances, arithmetic
operators (and the size of their operands), and hashing functions. Using memory compilers
and standard cell libraries, required hardware resources are provided in Section 4. The
final evaluation of each studied algorithm, in terms of area and power, is presented in
Section 5. Finally, our conclusions are given in Section 6.
2 Principles Definition
We have defined a set of rules to select and evaluate the reference implementations of
algorithms submitted to the NIST for PQC standardization process. These rules include
the inclusion-exclusion principles (Section 2.1), selection of the algorithms for evaluations
in this work (Section 2.2), criterion to estimate memory instances (Section 2.3), and finally,
the rules for estimating inputs and outputs of utilized arithmetic operators (Section 2.4).
Malik Imran, Zain Ul Abideen and Samuel Pagliarini 5
2.1 Inclusion-exclusion principles
We have defined the following principles for the inclusion-exclusion of a particular PQC
algorithm in our study:
• Participation in the NIST competition. Include only algorithms that were
considered on the NIST competition for standardization.
• Underlying cryptographic primitive. Include only algorithms that are built on
the security problems of lattice-based cryptography.
• Security levels. For each studied algorithm, we consider only the reference model
with the highest security level.
• Purpose of the algorithm. For each particular algorithm, there might be a
number of reference models that are developed either for encryption/decryption
or key encapsulations/establishments. We opt not to include all the reference
models as they serve inherently different purposes. Instead, we consider only the
encryption/decryption reference models.
2.2 Selection of algorithms and reference models
Based on the inclusion-exclusion principles defined above, we have selected twelve algorithms
for this study. The details of these algorithms are given in Table 1. Note that the selected
algorithms have many different reference models targeted for different security levels. We
denote these security levels as SLi. NIST has defined five different security levels for
the standardization process: security levels SL1, SL3, and SL5 are equivalent to security
levels of AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 bit key search. SL2 and SL4 are equivalent to
SHA-256/SHA3-256 and SHA-384/SHA3-384 bit collision search. Consequently, based on
the inclusion-exclusion principles, the selected reference models along with security levels
for our evaluations are shown in Fig 1.
Table 1: Classification of reference models according to security levels
Security
Level (SLi)
Type of
Algorithm Algorithm name Reference models
Security
Level-0 (SL0)
PKE Round5 r5nD-0kem-2iot
Security
Level-1 (SL1)
FrodoKEM frodokem640
NewHope newhope512cca, newhope512cpa
Crystals-KYBER kyber512, kyber512-90s
PKE LAC lac128
Round5
r5n1-1kem-0d, r5nD-1kem-0d, r5nD-1kem-
4longkey, 5nD-1kem-5d, r5n1-1pke-0d, r5nD-
1pke-0d, r5nD-5pke-5d
Saber Lightsaber
NTRU hps2048509
qTesla qtesla-I, qtesla-I-s, qtesla-p-I
DSA Crystals-Dilithium dilithium1, dilithium1-AES
Falcon falcon512
Security
Level-2 (SL2)
PKE
NTRU-Prime sntrup653, ntrulpr653
ThreeBears babybear, babybearephem
DSA
qTesla qtesla-II, qtesla-II-s
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Crystals-Dilithium dilithium2, dilithium2-AES
Falcon falcon768
Security
Level-3 (SL3)
PKE
NTRU-Prime sntrup761, ntrulpr761
FrodoKEM frodokem976
Crystals-KYBER kyber768, kyber768-90s
LAC lac192
Round5
r5n1-3kem-0d, r5nD-3kem-0d, r5nD-3kem-5d,
r5n1-3pke-0d, r5n1-3pke-0smallCT, r5nD-3pke-
0d, r5nD-3pke-5d
Saber Saber
NTRU hps2048677, hrss701
DSA
qTesla qtesla-III, qtesla-III-s, qtesla-p-III
Falcon qtesla-III, falcon768
Crystals-Dilithium dilithium3, dilithium3-AES
Security
Level-4 (SL4)
PKE
NTRU-Prime sntrup857, ntrulpr857
ThreeBears Mamabear
DSA
Crystals-Dilithium dilithium4, dilithium4-AES
Falcon falcon1024
Security
Level-5 (SL5)
PKE
FrodoKEM frodokem1344
NewHope newhope1024cca, newhope1024cpa
Crystals-KYBER kyber1024, kyber1024-90s
ThreeBears mamabearephem, papabear, papabearephem
LAC lac256
Round5 r5n1-5kem-0d, r5nD-5kem-0d, r5nD-5kem-5d,r5n1-5pke-0d, r5nD-5pke-0d, r5nD-5pke-5d
Saber Firesaber
NTRU hps4096821
DSA
Crystals-Dilithium dilithium4, dilithium4-AES
Falcon falcon1024
2.3 Memory estimation criterion
It is not uncommon for memories to take most of the area of a chip, especially in CPU-
centric designs. Therefore, correctly estimating the number, type, and sizes of utilized
memories is critical for assessing the size of an ASIC design. Memories are typically
âĂĲplaced by handâĂİ and bear large influence on the floorplan of a chip. Therefore, it
is important to correctly estimate the required memory instances using actual memory
compilers.
In this work, we estimate the memories that would be required by all the selected reference
models. We make a distinction between RAMs and ROMs because the compilers tend
to be very different – RAMs are typically an array of 6T/8T bitcells, while ROMs are
typically via-programmable structures. In the studied reference models, variables to which
only read operations are allowed are considered as a candidate for a ROM. Variables that
present both read and write operations are considered as RAM candidates. However, not
all variables are of interest for this exercise. For instance, variables that serve as flags
or for temporary storage would not require a RAM as these would most likely reside in
flip-flops or register banks. The same is true for small constants that do not require a
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Figure 1: Selected algorithms and the corresponding reference models utilized in this
study.
ROM. Instead, these can be hardwired with tie cells.
Moreover, different methods have been used to declare and initialize the memory
instances in the analysed reference models. The most commonly used methods are (1)
by scripting specific function, (2) by using arrays and (3) by introducing structures.
This analysis becomes more complicated when dynamic memory allocation is employed.
Different scenarios are highlighted in the code snippets shown in Fig. 2.
As shown in Fig 2(c), variables i and k are declared with the integer data type and
therefore would be considered as flip-flops. It is important to mention one more time that
we are interested in identifying actual memory instances, thus we ignore flip-flops at this
step. For instance, a member of the structure poly named coeffs (see Fig 2c) is considered
as a RAM instance. To estimate the size of each variable of interest, we assess the total
number of memory addresses indexed by it, as well as the number of bits stored at each
address. Consequently, we have adopted the following methods to estimate the number of
memory addresses in each memory instance and the number of stored bits at each memory
address:
Total number of memory addresses (p). In the reference implementations of
selected reference models, both static and dynamic memory allocation methods have been
used. For static allocation, memory size is known at compile time and observing the array
dimension is sufficient, whereas for dynamic allocation we have to locate all malloc calls
(direct or indirect). In Fig 2(b), a ROM memory instance with 128 memory addresses (8
elements in each row × total number of rows, i.e., 16) is presented. Some memory instances
are declared as structs and their size therefore depends on the members of the structure.
The individual members of the structure, i.e., arrays, strings, etc., can each be of different
types and lengths. For example, RAM memory instance in Fig 2(c), a structure with name
poly has one array type of member, i.e., coeffs [NTRU_N] where NTRU_N determines
the length of array and its value defines the total number of memory addresses. Similarly,
ROM memory instance in Fig 2(a), a structure with name z128 have two array type of
members, i.e., hi, and lo. Therefore, to evaluate structure type of memory instances we
have considered each member of structure as an individual memory instance.
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Figure 2: Examples of code snippets from PQC candidates that explain how memory
requirements were estimated.
Number of bits at each address (q). The utilized datatype determines the number
of bits to be stored at each memory address. For example, uint16_t is utilized in the
snippets of Fig. 2(b) and (c), therefore each memory address can store 16 bits. It is
important to emphasize that sometimes the code of a reference implementation may declare
a large structure as an array/matrix of uint64_t, even if not all elements require 64 bits
(see Fig. 2(a)). In our evaluations, for a given memory instance, we have considered the
length of all memory addresses the same.
2.4 Rules for the calculation of operand sizes
We have explored the reference models provided by the corresponding authors for the
identification of the length of different operands utilized in specific functions. This
analysis is particularly important for arithmetical operations that deal with large-size
inputs/outputs. Therefore, the total number of inputs and outputs are identified based
on the parameters passed to the function of interest, while the size of each operand is
identified based on its datatype. In a few cases, we had to resort to contacting the authors
for clarification on the operand sizes. For the many hashing operations present in the
reference implementations, sizes are already standardized by NIST itself and the effort lies
in identifying the correct hashing function employed.
Now that we have defined rules to assess the building blocks of PQC algorithms (memory
estimations, identification of arithmetic operators and their operand sizes, hashing functions,
etc.), we are ready to assess the selected NIST PQC candidates as ASIC accelerators.
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3 Assessment of Building Blocks of the Selected NIST
PQC Candidates
3.1 Memory estimations according to the defined criteria
Based on the principles defined in Section 2.3, we provide sizes for the ROM and RAM
instances in Tables 2 and 3, respectively. Furthermore, we have not provided entries in
Table 2 for those algorithms where no ROMs have been identified, meaning that most
likely the algorithm does not rely on precomputed constants. The first column of Tables 2
and 3 lists the name of the studied algorithm and the selected reference model. Starting
from the second column, the meaning of each column is: (2) required memory instances
(n), (3) number of memory addresses per instance (p), (4) number of bits stored at each
address (q), (5) size of each memory instance (r = p × q in Kbytes), (6) size of n memory
instances (s = n × r in Kbytes) and finally, (7) the total size (Totalsize) is the sum of size
for n memory instances, i.e., (Totalsize =
∑
(s) in Kbytes).
Table 2: Estimated sizes of required ROM instances
Algorithm (reference model) n p q r s Totalsize(Kbytes)
Crystals-KYBER (kyber1024-90s) 2 128 16 0.256 0.512 0.512
NewHope (newhope1024cca) 4 1024 16 2.048 8.192 8.192
LAC (lac256)
2 512 16 1.024 2.048
22.528
1 5120 32 20.480 20.480
qTesla (qtesla-p-III)
1 444 32 1.776 1.776
22.0001 224 64 1.792 1.792
2 2048 36 9.216 18.432
Falcon (falcon1024)
1 540 64 4.320 4.320
12.160
1 1080 16 2.160 2.160
2 31 64 0.248 0.496
2 27 64 0.216 0.432
2 30 64 0.240 0.480
2 1024 16 2.048 4.096
2 32 16 0.512 1.024
2 64 16 1.024 2.048
2 1024 8 1.024 2.048
2 256 8 0.256 0.512
2 512 8 0.512 1.024
Table 3: Estimated sizes of required RAM instances
Algorithm (reference model) n p q r s Totalsize(Kbytes)
NTRU-Prime (sntrup857)
1 256 8 0.256 0.256
0.448
1 24 64 0.192 0.192
FrodoKEM (frodokem1344)
3 10752 16 21.504 64.512
65.152
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5 64 16 0.128 0.640
Saber (firesaber)
1 32 8 0.032 0.032
1.888
2 32 16 0.064 0.128
1 128 8 0.128 0.128
1 128 16 0.256 0.256
1 64 8 0.064 0.064
1 64 16 0.128 0.128
1 4 512 0.256 0.256
1 4 1024 0.512 0.512
1 4 256 0.128 0.128
1 4 512 0.256 0.256
NTRU (hps4096821) 14 821 16 1.642 22.988 22.988
ThreeBears (papabearephem)
1 40 8 0.040 0.040
3.409
1 1584 8 1.584 1.584
1 1697 8 1.697 1.697
1 24 8 0.024 0.024
2 32 8 0.032 0.064
Round5 (r5nD-5pke-5d)
2 16 8 0.016 0.032
0.064
1 32 8 0.032 0.032
Crystals-Dilithium (dilithium4-AES) 3 256 32 1.024 3.072 3.072
Crystals-KYBER (kyber1024-90s)
5 256 16 0.512 2.560
2.816
1 128 16 0.256 0.256
NewHope (newhope1024cca) 8 1024 16 2.048 16.384 16.384
LAC (lac256)
1 2080 8 2.080 2.080
4.5601 1056 8 1.056 1.056
1 1024 8 1.424 1.424
qTesla (qtesla-p-III)
1 2048 8 2.048 2.048
152.576
1 9600 32 38.400 38.400
1 10240 32 49.960 40.960
1 1408 32 5.632 5.632
4 2048 64 16.384 65.536
Falcon (falcon1024)
5 1024 16 2.048 10.240
22.744
6 521 32 2.084 12.504
In the text that follows, we describe where the memory requirements are coming from
for each algorithm.
• NTRU-Prime. The implementation of NTRU-Prime algorithm requires only 2
RAM instances. One RAM instance with a size of 0.256 Kbytes and another instance
with a size of 0.192 Kbytes is required to store intermediate and final results of
arithmetic (modular addition and subtraction) and logical operations that take place
during the algorithm.
• FrodoKEM. The implementation of FrodoKEM requires 8 RAM instances. Three
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RAM instances with identical sizes of 21.504 Kbytes are required to perform modular
addition and subtraction operations over matrices of size M × N, where M is the
number of rows (1344) and N is the number of columns (either 1344 or 8). The
remaining (five) RAM instances with sizes of 0.128 Kbytes each are required to
perform addition and subtraction operations of M × N matrices, when value for
both M and N equals 8.
• Saber. The Saber algorithm requires 11 RAM instances for its implementation.
Two RAM instances with sizes of 0.064 Kbytes each are required to pack and unpack
3 bits. A RAM instance with a size of 0.032 Kbytes is required to implement
the transformation function BS2POL() of byte string into polynomial. Two RAM
instances of sizes 0.128 Kbytes and 0.256 Kbytes are required to pack and unpack 4
bits. To pack and unpack 6 bits, two RAM instances of sizes 0.064 Kbytes and 0.128
Kbytes are required. Moreover, four RAM instances of sizes 0.256 Kbytes, 0.512
Kbytes, 0.128 Kbytes and 0.256 Kbytes are required to implement the transformation
functions, i.e., POLVECN2BS() and BS2POLVECN(). The POLVECN2BS() function
takes a vector as an input and transforms it into a byte string while the function
BS2POLVECN() takes a byte string as an input and transforms it into a vector.
• NTRU. For implementation of NTRU, 14 RAM instances are required. All the
RAM instances with sizes of 1.642 Kbytes each are required to keep intermediate
and final results of the NTRU algorithm.
• ThreeBears. The reference implementation of ThreeBears requires only 6 RAM
instances. Two RAM instances with sizes of 0.040 Kbytes and 1.584 Kbytes are
required to hold private and public keys, respectively. Two RAM instances with
sizes of 1.697 Kbytes and 0.024 Kbytes are required to hold capsule and message
seed bytes. The remaining two RAM instances with sizes of 0.032 Kbytes each are
required to keep encapsulation seed bytes and shared secret bytes.
• Round5. The implementation of Round5 requires only 3 RAM instances. Two
RAM instances of size 0.016 Kbytes each are required to provide inputs and get
outputs to/from AES cores [30]. The remaining RAM instance with a size of 0.032
Kbytes is required to keep the key (outside the AES core) for the execution of AES
algorithm. It is important to mention that the structure of Round5 algorithm is
flexible and its security strength is based on defining the LWR problem [17].
• Crystals-Dilithium. The implementation of Crystals-Dilithium requires only 3
RAM instances to keep intermediate results for polynomial addition and subtraction
operations. All three instances require 1.024 Kbytes.
• Crystals-KYBER. The reference model of Crystals-KYBER algorithm requires 2
ROM and 6 RAM instances, respectively. Two ROM instances of size 0.256 Kbytes
each are required to keep original and inverse of original Zeta values, which are
required for the NTT computations. Five RAM instances with sizes of 0.512 Kbytes
each are required to decompress the polynomials (1 instance), to perform polynomial
arithmetic operations – modular addition and subtraction (3 instances), and to
convert polynomial coefficients for modular multiplications from Montgomery to
normal domain (1 instance). The remaining RAM instance with size 0.256 Kbytes is
required to convert bytes to polynomials.
• NewHope. The reference implementation of NewHope algorithm requires 4 ROM
and 8 RAM instances. The four ROM instances with sizes of 2.048 Kbytes each
are required to keep pre-computed constant values for executing, (1) bitrev_table,
(2) omegas _inv_bitrev_montgomery, (3) gammas_bitrev_montgomery and (4)
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gammas_inv_montgomery. The bitrev_table contains 10-bit indices and is required
to re-order the polynomials. The omegas_inv_bitrev_montgomery contains inverses
of powers of nth root of unity in Montgomery domain with R = 218 in bit reversed
order. The gammas_bitrev_montgomery keeps powers of nth root of -1 in Mont-
gomery domain with R = 218 in bit reversed order. The gammas _inv_montgomery
holds inverses of powers of nth root of -1 divided by n in Montgomery domain with
R = 218. The RAM instances (total=8), each sized as 2.048 Kbytes, are required to
compute arithmetic operations (instead of modular multiplications) over polynomial
representations.
• LAC. The LAC algorithm requires 3 ROM and 3 RAM instances for its implementa-
tion. Two ROM instances with sizes of 1.024 Kbytes each are required to keep initial
power and log values for the polynomial computations. One ROM instance with a
size of 20.480 Kbytes is required to hold modulus values required for the reduction
of polynomials after multiplication operation. Three RAM instances with sizes of
2.080 Kbytes, 1.056 Kbytes and 1.424 Kbytes are required to keep bytes of generated
secret key, public key and the cipher texts.
• qTesla. The implementation of qTesla requires 4 ROM and 8 RAM instances.
ROM instances with sizes of 1.776 Kbytes, 1.792 Kbytes, 9.216 Kbytes, and 9.216
Kbytes are required to hold initial values for the Gaussian sampler with 32-bit
words, Gaussian sampler with 64-bit words, constants for the Zeta computations,
and constants for the inverse Zeta computations, respectively. One RAM instance
with a size of 2.048 Kbytes is required to pack the secret key. Two RAM instances
with sizes of 38.400 Kbytes and 40.960 Kbytes are required to encode and decode the
public key. Two instances of RAMs with sizes of 5.632 Kbytes and 16.384 Kbytes are
required to encode and decode sampled message. Three RAM instances with sizes of
16.384 Kbytes each are required to perform polynomials addition and subtraction
operations.
• Falcon. The reference implementation of Falcon requires 20 ROM and 13 RAM
instances. Two ROM instances with sizes of 4.32 Kbytes and 2.16 Kbytes are required
to keep initial values for discrete Gaussian distributions and bit reversal index table,
respectively. Two ROM instances with sizes of 0.248 Kbytes each are required to
hold precomputed continuous cumulative distribution function (CoDF) values. For
small primes, two ROM instances with sizes of 0.216 Kbytes each are required to
hold precomputed cumulative distribution function (CDF) values. Similarly, for large
primes, two ROM instances with sizes of 0.240 Kbytes each are required to hold
precomputed CDF values. For binary polynomials, two ROM instances with the
same size of 2.048 Kbytes are required to keep initial values for the computation of
NTT and inverse NTT operations. For ternary polynomials, four ROM instances
with sizes of 0.512 Kbytes (2 instances) and 1.024 Kbytes (2 instances) are required
to keep initial values for the computation of NTT and inverse NTT operations. For
complex number computations, a total of six ROM instances with sizes of 1.024
Kbytes (2 instances), 0.256 Kbytes (2 instances) and 0.512 Kbytes (2 instances)
are required to keep initial values of real and imaginary parts of normal, binary,
and cubic/ternary polynomials. Five RAM instances, each sized 2.048 Kbytes, are
required to generate initial parameters using Gaussian distribution function. Six
RAM instances with sizes of 2.084 Kbytes each are required to generate small primes
(namely p, g and s in the reference implementation) for both binary and ternary
polynomials.
As summarized, the requirements for ROM and RAM sizes are relatively small by
modern software standards. For instance, for the algorithm with the highest memory
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requirement, qTesla, the values are well under 1Mbyte. However, when considering ASIC
implementations, these memory sizes are not modest and may render some algorithms
severely less attractive than others. In order to give a better understanding of the magnitude
of the memory sizes, we later provide area values in Tables 6 and 7 of Section 4.1.
3.2 Common arithmetic operators and operand sizes
According to the rules defined in Section 2.4, the identified common arithmetic operators
and the length of input and output operands are shown in Table 4. In the first column,
the name of particular algorithm and its reference model is presented. The second column
is further divided into three subcolumns: (1) identified common arithmetic operators,
(2) used function name in the provided reference implementations and the name of
algorithm/method used for implementations (in parentheses) and finally, (3) the length of
required input (OP1, OP2 & OP3) and output (OP4) operands in bits. Our analysis focuses
on arithmetic operators of large sizes and of high computational complexity. Naturally,
multiplication stands out among those operations listed in Table 4.
Table 4: Required common arithmetic operators and the length of input and output
operands
Algorithm
(reference model)
Details of arithmetic operators and operand lengths (in bits)
Operators Function name (method)
Input/Output operands
OP1 OP2 OP3 OP4
NTRU-Prime
(sntrup857) A × B
Rq_mult_small() (SBM) 12176 6088 - 12176
Rq_mult() (SBM) 6088 6088 - 6088
FrodoKEM
(frodokem1344)
(C− × A−) +
B−
frodo_mul_add_as_plus_e()
(SBM)
172032 172032 128 172032
(C− × A−) +
B−
frodo_mul_add _sa_plus_e()
(SBM)
172032 172032 128 172032
(A− × B−) +
C−
frodo_mul_add _sb_plus_e()
(SBM)
172032 172032 128 128
A− ×B− frodo_mul _bs() (SBM) 172032 172032 128 128
A− +B− poly_add() (SBM) 128 128 - 128
A− −B− poly_sub() (SBM) 128 128 - 128
Saber (firesaber) (A×B) karatsuba_simple() (KM)
4096 4096 - 4096
toom_cook_4way() (TCM) 4096 4096 - 4096
NTRU
(hps4096821)
(A×B) poly_Rq_mul() (KM) 11216 11216 - 11216
poly_Sq_mul() (TCM) 11216 11216 - 11216
1/A poly_S3_inv() (Almost algo) 11216 - - 11216
ThreeBears
(papabearephem) += A×B mac() (2-Way KM) 3120 3120 - 3120
Round5
(r5nD-5pke-5d)
(A− ×B−) ringmul_p() (SBM) 15136 6208 - 7840
(A− ×B−) ringmul_p() (SBM) 15136 6208 - 15136
Crystals-Dilithium
(dilithium4-AES)
(A+B) poly_add() (SBM) 8192 8192 - 8192
(A−B) poly_sub() (SBM) 8192 8192 - 8192
(A×B) poly_pointwise _invmont-gomery() (NTT) 8192 8192 - 8192
Crystals-KYBER
(kyber1024-90s)
A×B poly_basemul() (NTT) 3072 3072 - 3072
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A− +B− poly_add() (SBM) 3072 3072 - 3072
A− −B− poly_sub() (SBM) 3072 3072 - 3072
NewHope
(newhope1024cca)
A×B poly_mul _pointwise() (NTT) 16384 16384 - 16384
A− +B− poly_add() (SBM) 128 128 - 128
A− −B− poly_sub() (SBM) 128 128 - 128
LAC (lac256)
A×B poly_aff() (SBM) 8192 8192 8192 8192
(A×B) + C poly_mul() (SBM) 8192 8192 32 8192
qTesla
(qtesla-p-III)
(A×B) poly_mul() (NTT) 16384 16384 - 16384
(A+B) poly_add() (SBM) 16384 16384 - 16384
(A−B) poly_sub_reduce() (SBM) 16384 16384 - 16384
Falcon (falcon1024)
(A−B) mq_poly_sub() (SBM) 24576 24576 - 24576
(A×B) mq_poly_montymul_ntt()
(Mont)
24576 24576 - 24576
(A×B) mq_montymul() (Mont) 32 32 32 32
As shown in the second column of Table 4, operations such as addition, subtraction,
and multiplication are frequently used in the reference implementations. Apart from the
identified operators in Table 4, there are also various other operators such as logical,
arithmetic (inversion/division), reduction (modular and Montgomery), etc., that are used
in the reference implementations to perform different functions. For instance, there are
several functions that handle coordinate conversions/re-conversions from one domain
to another (classical/affine to NTT or Montgomery and vice versa). Additionally, the
NIST PQC candidates require different sampler functions for multiple purposes such as
generating public parameters in a particular algorithm. The arithmetic additions and
subtraction operations, shown in column three of Table 4, are commonly implemented by
using schoolbook method.
It is worth mentioning that several algorithms make use of rather large operands
(see fourth column of Table 4). This being said, it is the multiplication operation that
becomes the most computationally intensive operation and this is reflected by the fact
that several authors carefully optimised their codes for handling the multiplication of such
large operand sizes. Several different methods are considered, including schoolbook [31],
2-Way Karatsuba [32], 4-Way Toom-Cook [33], NTT [34] and Montgomery [35] methods.
Consequently, in the text that follows, we discuss the identified multiplication methods
utilized by the candidates of the NIST PQC competition.
Schoolbook method (SBM). The schoolbook method by generating partial prod-
ucts and matrix multiplications is often applied to lattice-based cryptography [31]. In
the studied algorithms, it was applied in [8], [9], [13], [17] and [14]. Generating partial
products. Multiplications by generating partial products is implemented in NTRU-
Prime, LAC, and NTRU algorithms. In NTRU-Prime, the identified multiplier functions,
i.e., R3_mult() and Rq_mult_small(), make use of SBM by generating partial products
along with shifting and addition operations. For LAC algorithm, the poly_mul() and
poly_aff() functions are implemented to compute polynomial multiplications using shifting
and addition operations. The function poly_aff() computes multiplication over addi-
tion, i.e., (A×B) + C, while in poly_mul() function, only the polynomial multiplication
is performed. The size of the operands in the LAC algorithm is 8192 bits. In both
NTRU-Prime and LAC algorithms, a modular reduction mod_q is applied to reduce the
resultant polynomial. In NTRU algorithm, multiplication using shifting and addition
operations along with mod_3 and mod_q reductions are implemented in poly_Rq_mul(),
poly_Sq_mul() and poly_S3_mul() functions. Furthermore, an almost inverse algorithm
is implemented in poly_S3_inv() function for the computations of polynomial inversion
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operation. For both multiplication and inversion operations, inputs and outputs are
11216 bits in length. Matrix multiplications. Matrix multiplication using schoolbook
method is considered in FrodoKEM and Round5 algorithms. For FrodoKEM algorithm,
matrix multiplications are implemented in frodo_mul_add_as_plus_e(), frodo_mul_bs(),
frodo_mul_add_sa_plus_e(), and frodo_mul_add_sb_plus_e() functions. The row-
wise multiplications are performed in frodo_mul_add_as_plus_e() and frodo_mul_bs()
functions while in frodo_mul_add_sa_plus_e() and frodo_mul_add_sb_plus_e() func-
tions, column-wise multiplications are implemented. Furthermore, in the function
frodo_mul_add_as_plus_e(), the second operand, i.e., OP2, is multiplied with the
first operand, i.e., OP1, and then added to the third operand, i.e., OP3, to generate the
final output. In the function frodo_mul_bs(), OP2 is multiplied with the first operand,
i.e., OP1, and the resultant product is stored. The function frodo_mul_add_sa_plus_e()
allows multiplication of OP1 by OP2 and then adds OP3 to the product to generate the
final output. The function frodo_mul_add_sb_plus_e() allows multiplication of OP2 by
OP1, and then adds OP3 to the product to generate the final output. In Round5 algorithm,
row-wise matrix multiplication method is implemented in ringmul_p() and ringmul_q()
functions. FrodoKEM uses 16 bit data types in reference implementations, so a modulo
216 is used for modular reduction (see section 1.2.3 in reference [9]) while in Round5, modq
reduction is implemented (see section 2.2 in reference [17]).
Karatsuba (KM) [32,36] and Toom-Cook (TCM) [33] multipliers. Both KM
and TCM are based on the idea of splitting input operands into n parts, where n determines
the length of each split operand. Then, the multiplication of each split part (n) is recursively
computed using addition and shift operations. For mathematical formulations, interested
readers can turn to [32,33,36]. Functions named karatsuba_simple() and toom_cook_4way()
are implemented in Saber to perform multiplications using 2-Way KM and 4-Way TCM
with modq reduction. In [18], the terms 2-Way and 4-Way imply that the input operands
are split into 2 and 4 equal parts for multiplication and the required operands length for
multiplication computations are 4096 bits. The multiply and accumulate function, i.e.,
mac(), is implemented in ThreeBears for combined polynomial multiplication and addition
using a 2-Way KM. It takes input operand sizes of 3120 bits and generates 3120 bits as an
output after modulo reduction (it uses mod(n)).
NTT method [37]. Discrete Fourier transform (DFT) has numerous applications in
signal processing and multiplication of large numbers or operands. NTT is the generalized
form of DFT which exploits the convolution feature to multiply large operands [34]. For
comprehensive mathematical formulations and general understanding of transformations
over NTT-based multiplication method, we refer to [37]. The NTT method for polynomial
multiplications with Montgomery reduction is utilized in NewHope, Crystals-KYBER,
qTesla, and Crystals-Dilithium algorithms. The function named poly_mul_pointwise()
is implemented in NewHope for the computation of multiplication and it takes operands
that are 16384 bits long. In Crystals-KYBER, qTesla, and Crystals-Dilithium algorithms,
the corresponding multiplication functions are named poly_basemul(), poly_mul() and
poly_pointwise_invmontgomery(), respectively. Furthermore, each polynomial in the
Crystals-KYBER algorithm has 256 coefficients and each coefficient is in the set 0, 1 âĂę
3328. To represent one coefficient, we need 12 bits, so a straightforward representation
takes 256 × 12 = 3072 bits in length for each operand. Similarly, each polynomial in
NewHope and qTesla algorithms contain 1024 coefficients and each coefficient is 16 bits
in length, so 16384 (1024 × 16) bits for each operand is required. Similarly, the required
operand length of multiplier functions in Crystals-Dilithium algorithm is 8192 bits.
Montgomery multiplier [35]. Montgomery multiplication is a faster way to get
products and is often preferred in cryptographic applications [38]. To perform the mul-
tiplication, the input operands are first converted into Montgomery domain and then
multiplication is performed on Montgomery representation. For complete mathematical
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formulations regarding the Montgomery algorithm, we redirect the reader to [35]. The
functions named mq_poly_montymul_ntt() and mq_montymul() are implemented in
Falcon algorithm for polynomial multiplications using the Montgomery multiplication. The
operand size in mq_montymul() function is 32 bits, while in mq_poly_montymul_ntt()
function, 24576 bits are utilizes.
The required computational cost (in terms of clock cycles) of SBM, 2-Way KM, 4-Way
TCM, NTT, and Montgomery multiplication methods, when ignoring coordinate/domain
conversions, are m-1, (m/2)-1, (m/4)-1, 2m+2log2n and 2m-1, where m is the operand
length. Moreover, the lattice-based NIST PQC candidates perform reduction operations
over prime and binary numbers/fields/rings. The number of clock cycles required for
reduction routines can be a function of the multiplier architecture and the number of clock
cycles required for each multiplication operation. We expand on this argument in Section
4.2
3.3 Hashing algorithms
Apart from the memories and arithmetic operators, NIST PQC algorithms also make use of
known cryptographic primitives. Different hash functions and block ciphers are employed
for different purposes (e.g., AES and SHA are utilized for generating random numbers,
secure hashing in key generations, encapsulation/decapsulation, encryption/decryption
processes, as well as in message digests). In short, a hashing function transforms data
(message string) of arbitrary size to fixed-size values. The values returned by a hash
function as an output is termed as hash values, codes, digests, or hashes. In practice,
a hash function may be considered to perform three functions, i.e., (1) convert variable
length keys into fixed length, (2) scramble the bits of a key so that the resulting values
are uniformly distributed over the key space, and (3) map key values into ones less than
or equal to the size of the message. However, in NIST PQC algorithms, hash functions
are frequently utilized for scrambling the bits of the key so that the resulting values are
uniformly distributed over key space.
The variants of the SHA family of secure hash functions are SHA0, SHA1, SHA2, and
SHA3. As shown in Table 5, the lattice-based PQC algorithms involved in the competition
use a combination of both SHA2 and SHA3 functions. The first column in Table 5 provides
the name of algorithm along with reference model in parentheses, while the name of the
hash function is presented in the second column. We have placed a dash “–” symbol in the
entries of Table 5 where neither hash nor AES algorithm is utilized.
The SHA2 family consists of six hash functions, named as SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-
384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224 and SHA-512/256, while SHA3 family constitutes four hash
functions, termed as SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512, and two extendable-
output hash functions (XOF), named SHAKE-128 and SHAKE-256. The SHA2 and SHA3
functions and extendable-output hash functions that take two parameters (M, d). The
first parameter denotes the input message M while the second parameter d determines the
output length in bits. The value of d for all hash functions is fixed, while for XOF functions,
SHAKE-128 and SHAKE-256, it depends on the user. The SHAKE-128 and SHAKE-256
functions can be used as customizable SHAKE (cSHAKE-128 and cSHAKE-256) with two
additional inputs, i.e., function name bit string (N ) and a customization bit string (S).
Whenever, N and S are both empty strings then cSHAKE (M, d, N, S) is equivalent to
SHAKE (M, d).
Table 5: Hash algorithms utilized in the reference implementations of lattice-based PQC
algorithms
Algorithm (reference model) Name of the hashing method utilized
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NTRU-Prime (sntrup857) SHA2-512
FrodoKEM (frodokem1344) AES-128 (or) SHAKE-128 for matrix generationSHAKE-128 (or) SHAKE-256 for key generation/encryption
Saber (firesaber) SHAKE-128, SHA3-256 and SHA3-512
NTRU (hps4096821) SHA3-256
ThreeBears (papabearephem) cSHAKE-256
Round5 (r5nD-5pke-5d) cSHAKE-256 and AES-256
Crystals-Dilithium (dilithium4-AES) SHAKE-128 and SHAKE-256
Crystals-KYBER (kyber1024-90s) AES-256, SHA2-256, SHA2-512 and SHAKE-256
NewHope (newhope1024cca) SHAKE-128 and SHAKE-256
LAC (lac256) -
qTesla (qtesla-p-III) SHAKE-256, cSHAKE-128 and cSHAKE-256
Falcon (falcon1024) SHAKE-256
In the text that follows, we describe the use of hash methods and block ciphers in
selected NIST PQC algorithms. The required output lengths (in bits) for SHAKE and
cSHAKE variants are also described below.
• NTRU-Prime. NTRU-Prime uses SHA2-512 for hashing a session key. In the
reference implementation, only the first 256 bits of output generated by SHA-512
have been used, as the idea was to reduce the requirement for inclusion of extra bits
at inputs (as used in reference [8] to generate the public key) and makes it flexible
to switch to another 256 bit hash function if desired. For mathematical descriptions,
readers can redirect to sections 3.1 and 4.7 in reference [8].
• FrodoKEM. The FrodoKEM reference implementation comes in two flavours, either
using AES or SHAKE. Naturally, the AES variants (FrodoKEM-640-AES, FrodoKEM-
976-AES, and FrodoKEM-1344-AES) are more convenient for devices containing
AES hardware acceleration such as AES-NI on Intel platforms. On the other hand,
SHAKE variants (FrodoKEM-640-SHAKE, FrodoKEM-976-SHAKE, and FrodoKEM-
1344-SHAKE) provide better performance in comparison with AES variants when
no hardware acceleration is in place [9]. To pseudorandomly generate a large public
matrix, the AES variants of FrodoKEM use AES-128 while SHAKE variants uses
SHAKE-128 (see algorithms 7–8 on page 16 of [9]). For key generation and encryption
processes, all variants of FrodoKEM use SHAKE-128 (or) SHAKE-256 (see algorithms
9–10 on page 17 of [9]). Therefore, in our evaluations, we have used an instance of
AES-128 for matrix generation and an instance of SHAKE-256 for key generation and
encryption processes. Based on the parameters provided in [9], implementation of
SHAKE takes an arbitrary length of string (0x5F||seedSE) as an input and generates
an output length 344064 (in bits) for key generation (see line 4 of algorithm 9 in [9]).
In context of hardware implementations, the similar SHAKE core could be used for
encryption process as it generates an output length smaller than the key generation.
Hence, we have chosen an instance of SHAKE-256 to generate an output length 1024
(in bits) for both key generation and encryption processes. Using this instance to
generate an hashing output over 344064 bits, 336 clock cycles are required (ratio of
344064 to 1024).
• Saber. SHAKE-128, SHA3-256, and SHA3-512 are utilized in the reference imple-
mentation of Saber. SHAKE-128 is used for generation of pseudorandom matrix A
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from a seedA and for public and secret key pair generations (see algorithms 15–17 on
page 22 & 23 of [18]). Different instances of SHAKE-128, in algorithms 15, 16 and
17 of [18], result in outputs of lengths 768, 6656, and 256 bits. For our evaluations,
we have used an instance of SHAKE-128 with an output length 768 bits, as in
hardware the similar resources of SHAKE-128 can be used to generate an output
of lengths 6656 and 256 bits respectively. Similarly, the instances of SHA3-256 and
SHA3-512 with an output byte string of lengths 32 and 64 are used in encapsulation
and decapsulation processes of Saber (see algorithms 20–22 on pages 25 & 26 of [18]).
• NTRU. In NTRU, SHA3-256 function with an output length of 256 bits is required
for key encapsulation and decapsulation processes (see section 1.12 on page 19 of [14]).
• ThreeBears. It uses cSHAKE-256 for multiple purposes such as to generate uniform
and noise samplers (see algorithm 1 on page 18 of [12]), keypair generation (see
algorithm 5 on page 23 of [12]), encapsulation (see algorithm 6 on page 25 of [12])
and decapsulation (see algorithm 7 on page 26 of [12]). Two different modifications
have been considered in SHAKE-256 to develop cSHAKE-256. However, in the
first one, they used an additional 1 byte “purpose” p to differentiate multiple
purposes to each other and finally, they have introduced a zero byte between the
purpose parameter and the purpose byte for word alignment in the incoming string.
Based on the aforesaid modifications, the hash function the authors have used is
cSHAKE256(pblock||[0.p]||data, 8.L, “ ”, “ThreeBears”). For complete descriptions,
readers can refer to section 2.4.1 on page 17 of [12]. Therefore, the aforementioned
cSHAKE function requires an output length 2496 bits for uniform and noise samplers
while for remaining purposes an output length of 256 bits is required. Consequently,
we have used an instance of aforementioned cSHAKE function with an output length
256 bits to evaluate the hardware resources.
• Round5. It uses a cSHAKE-256 and an instance of AES-256 for hashing purposes.
cSHAKE-256 is used in the construction of the permutations while AES-256 is utilized
as an alternative to generate random data. The cSHAKE-256 implementation takes
a byte string as an input and outputs a hashed byte (see section 2.11.4 of [17]).
Moreover, cSHAKE-128 is used when the security parameter kappa is equal to 128
(this is for lower security levels, i.e., SL1 and SL3). Consequently, we have used only
the cSHAKE-256 (with desired output length 256 bits) and an instance of AES-256
for our evaluations as we are considering only the highest security level SL5.
• Crystals-Dilithium. Two XOF functions, i.e., SHAKE-128 and SHAKE-256, are
required for matrix generation, signature signing, and verification procedures in
Crystals-Dilithium. An instance of SHAKE-128 with an output length of 256 bits
is used to generate a public matrix A from a seed value to set a public key and
the generated matrix is needed for both signature signing and its veriïňĄcation (see
lines 1 and 2 in Figure 4 on page 12 of [19]). Similarly, an instance of SHAKE-256
with output length of 384 bits is used (see lines 7, 10, 12, and 27 on page 12 of the
same figure). However, for complete descriptions, readers can turn to section 4.3 in
reference [19].
• Crystals-KYBER. In the selected variant of Crystals-KYBER (kyber1024-90s),
there are four hash functions utilized: an XOF using AES-256 in CTR mode, an
H function using SHA2-256, an G function using SHA2-512, a PRF(s, b) function
using AES-256 where s is used as the key and b is zero-padded to a 12-byte nonce,
and finally a KDF function that utilizes SHAKE-256 (see section 1.4 on page 11
of [11]). These five functions are used in key generation, encryption, encapsulation
and decapsulation processes (see algorithms 4, 5, and 7 to 9 on page 9 to 11 of [11]).
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The requested output length in aforementioned functions is 256; therefore, we have
used an instance of SHAKE-256 for our evaluations with an output length 256 bits.
• NewHope. SHAKE-128 and SHAKE-256 functions have been utilized with different
inputs/outputs length in NewHope. For example, SHAKE-128 is used to generate
the public parameters from a public seed state ← SHAKE128Absorb(d) function. It
takes as input a byte array d and results in a byte array of length 200 (state) (see
line 8 in algorithm 5 on page 9 of [10]). In another case, SHAKE-128 is utilized as
buf, state ← SHAKE128Squeeze(j, state) function where j determines the amount of
output blocks of SHAKE-128 to be produced and a state with 200 bytes length (see
line 10 in algorithm 5 on page 9 of [10]). It produces a byte array buf of length 16
× j and a byte array state of length 200 as an output. A SHAKE-256 function for
different output lengths (512, 768 and 1024 bits) has been used to hash and extend
the output of the random number generator in key generation, encapsulation and
decapsulation functions (see algorithms 1, 4, 17–21 in reference [10]). Therefore, we
have used an instance each of SHAKE-128 and SHAKE-256 for output lengths 1600
(200 bytes×8) and 1024 bits, respectively.
• qTesla. In the selected qtesla-p-III variant, an instance of SHAKE-256 is used for
seed generation (see algorithm 9 in reference [15]) and for hash functions G, H (see
algorithm 13 in reference [15]). A cSHAKE-256 function is used to sample polynomial
y using GaussSampler and ySampler functions, respectively (see algorithms, 11 &
12 in reference [15]). cSHAKE-128 is used for generation of public polynomials
using function GenA (see algorithm 10 in reference [15]) and for encoding purposes
using function Enc (see algorithm 14 in reference [15]). The aforesaid functions
have been utilized for different output lengths. Consequently, in our evaluation we
have considered an instance of each XOF function: SHAKE-256, cSHAKE-128, and
cSHAKE-256, all with identical output lengths of 256 bits.
• Falcon. SHAKE-256 is utilized in Falcon, where it takes an arbitrary length string
as an input and produces 16 bits of hashed chunks as an output (see algorithm 3
at top of page 32 in reference [16]). From an implementation point of view, it has
been highlighted that it might be difficult to efficiently implement SHAKE-256 in a
constant-time way (see section 4.5.2 for details on page 22 of reference [16]). However,
for efficient utilization of SHAKE-256, instead of 16, 64 bits can be extracted as an
output [16]. This was adopted in our evaluation as well.
Now that we have thoroughly analysed the reference implementations of selected NIST
PQC candidates and identified all basic building blocks of interest, we can proceed with
comparisons. The next section takes a look at how the studied algorithms would fare
as ASIC accelerators, where we report area and power values for a given frequency of
operation. Our approach has, without a doubt, many caveats. These are carefully discussed
later in Section 5.
4 NIST PQC Candidates as ASIC Accelerators
In this section, we provide actual implementation characteristics of the identified building
blocks such that we can evaluate the lattice-based NIST PQC algorithms as ASIC acceler-
ators. We make use of commercial memory compilers and a standard cell library, both
designed for the same 65nm âĂĲlow-powerâĂİ technology. For the sake of comparison,
while not revealing foundry privileged information, we clarify that the nominal supply
voltage is 1.2V for both memories and logic. Without loss of generality, our analysis is
performed only for the typical-typical corner (TT), i.e., P=1, V=1.2V, and T=25C.
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In Section 4.1, we present our ROM and RAM data. In Section 4.2, we provide
the implementation results for selected SBM multiplier. Hashing functions and their
implementation are given in Section 4.3.
4.1 Memory characteristics
Area, max frequency, and power characteristics of each memory instance required by the
many different algorithms are obtained from commercial memory compilers optimized for
our 65nm technology of choice. The compilers output several files, including datasheets,
LEF abstracts, LIB timing information, and GDSII layouts. The information presented in
this section was extracted from over 50+ datasheets.
Knowing the number of addresses and the size of each address is, unfortunately, not
enough to estimate the characteristics of each memory instace. The memory compiler
works under certain assumptions, so the user has to pick values that are within acceptable
ranges. The most significant limitation comes from the choice of a column-mux ratio, which
not only determines the aspect ratio of the actual memory, as well as bounds for address
and data ranges. Thus, the valid range for p (number of addresses) and q (bits stored at
each address) depends on the column-mux ratio. Considering the memory compilation for
RAM, there are three available options to select column-mux ratio: 4, 8, and 16. Similarly,
for ROMs, there are four available choices (4, 8, 16, and 32). While using different values
of column-mux ratio does not affect the overall size of the generated memory, it does affect
the performance. Without loss of generality, we have selected 8 as column-mux ratio for
calculations of both ROM and RAM memory instances reported in this work.
The ROM and RAM memory compilers used in this work are very similar. The main
difference is that we have to define the data content for the ROM compiler because it does
not initialize data. Therefore, we had to create data initialization files for each generated
ROM memory instances. To this end, we have prepared a MATLAB script to make sure
that the ROMs are initialized with a proper ratio of zeros and ones, otherwise the power
estimation would be skewed. The output generated by MATLAB has been converted into
an ’Intel format’ using a Perl script. The converted file is then passed as an input to the
memory compiler for the actual compilation.
The values collected from the generated compiled memories are shown in Tables 6 and
7. The first column in Tables 6 and 7 lists the related algorithm while the second column
presents numerical values for p (memory addresses) and q (number of bits at each address)
that were provided as inputs to memory compiler. Due to certain limitations in the tool,
as discussed earlier, the present form of values of p and q (shown in second column of
Tables 6 and 7) could not be used directly as an input to the commercial memory compiler.
Therefore, we have rounded off the values of p and q to make it possible to use as an input
to the memory compiler. The sizes of the ROM and RAM instances, given bt W (width
of the memory cell) and H (height of the memory cell), are shown in column three of
Tables 6 and 7. For n number of required memory instances, the total area is calculated
by product of width of the memory cell, height of the memory cell and the number of
required memory instances (n), as shown in column four of Tables 6 and 7. Finally, power
consumption values, both static (in µW ) and dynamic (µW×F), are provided in column
five of Tables 6 and 7. All generated memories are single port and perform one operation
per clock cycle.
Table 6: Characteristics of ROMs generated using commercial memory compiler
Algorithm
Input to
compiler
Memory
dimensions
(in µm)
Total area
(in mm2)
=W × H × n
Power consumption
p q W H Static(µW)
Dynamic
(µW×F)
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Crystals-KYBER 128 16 85.7 36.2 0.0062 0.175 5.541
NewHope 1024 16 85.7 80.4 0.0276 0.310 8.455
LAC
512 16 85.7 55.1 0.0094 0.232 7.0224
5120 32 128.7 308.3 0.0397 1.281 17.750
qTesla
444 32 128.7 52.0 0.0067 0.266 11.553
224 64 214.6 40.9 0.0088 0.316 17.9650
2048 36 139.4 137.2 0.0383 0.600 17.089
Falcon
540 64 214.6 56.7 0.0122 0.364 22.329
1080 16 85.7 89.8 0.0077 0.379 8.520
31 64 214.6 31.4 0.0135 0.288 15.190
27 64 214.6 31.4 0.0135 0.288 15.190
30 64 214.6 31.4 0.0135 0.288 15.190
1024 16 85.7 80.4 0.0138 0.309 8.455
32 16 85.7 31.4 0.0054 0.160 5.121
64 16 85.7 33.0 0.0057 0.165 5.272
1024 8 64.2 80.4 0.0103 0.309 8.455
256 8 64.2 42.5 0.0055 0.174 3.988
512 8 64.2 55.1 0.0071 0.232 7.022
Table 7: Characteristics of RAMs generated using commercial memory compiler
Algorithm
Inputs to
compiler
Memory
dimensions
(in µm)
Total area
(in mm2)
=W × H × n
Power consumption
p q W H Static(µW)
Dynamic
(µW×F)
NTRU-Prime
256 8 112.8 160.5 0.1087 0.331 8.307
24 64 79.2 161.5 0.0768 0.331 5.488
FrodoKEM
10752 16 311.1 59.1 0.0184 0.2136 22.656
64 16 109.5 59.1 0.0065 0.084 6.613
Saber
32 8 75.9 55.1 0.0042 0.056 3.832
32 16 109.5 55.1 0.0121 0.112 6.452
128 8 75.9 67.1 0.0051 0.076 4.149
128 16 109.5 67.1 0.0174 0.103 6.932
64 8 75.9 59.1 0.0045 0.062 3.938
64 16 109.5 59.1 0.0065 0.084 6.613
4 512 647.1 55.1 0.0357 0.376 13.083
4 1024 647.1 55.1 0.0357 0.376 5.758
4 256 647.1 55.1 0.0357 0.376 7.156
4 512 647.1 55.1 0.0357 0.376 13.083
NTRU 821 16 112.8 156.5 0.2473 0.319 82.280
ThreeBears
40 8 75.9 56.1 0.0043 0.057 3.859
1584 8 79.2 253.9 0.0201 0.399 6.772
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1697 8 79.2 268.9 0.0213 0.426 6.978
24 8 75.9 55.1 0.0042 0.056 3.832
32 8 75.9 55.1 0.0042 0.056 3.832
Round5
16 8 75.9 55.1 0.0042 0.056 3.832
32 8 75.9 55.1 0.0042 0.056 3.832
Crystals-Dilithium 256 32 176.7 83.1 0.0441 0.216 12.762
Crystals-KYBER
256 16 109.5 83.1 0.0729 0.141 7.156
128 16 109.5 67.1 0.0074 0.103 6.932
NewHope 1024 16 112.8 181.5 0.1639 0.379 8.624
LAC
2080 8 183.7 32.8 0.0121 70.628 7.563
1056 8 79.2 186.3 0.0148 0.285 5.874
1024 8 79.2 181.5 0.0144 0.279 5.758
qTesla
2048 8 79.2 312.7 0.0248 0.319 11.553
9600 32 180.0 312.7 0.2815 1.050 69.676
10240 32 180.0 312.7 0.2815 1.050 87.096
1408 32 180.0 231.1 0.0416 0.756 15.661
2048 64 314.4 312.7 0.3934 1.784 30.560
Falcon
1024 16 112.8 181.5 0.0205 0.379 8.624
521 32 180.0 118.7 0.1287 0.454 13.83
4.2 Implementation of identified multipliers
It is important to emphasize that there are many options available to implement the
multiplication operations required by the studied algorithms. For this reason, we provide
a thorough discussion about multiplier architectures in Appendix A. There, we compare
SBM, 2-Way KM, 3-Way TCM, and 4-Way TCM over a range of large operand sizes.
The outcome of this discussion is that the SBM is advantageous as it leads to low area,
reasonable frequency of operation, and, most importantly, the lowest power consumption
of the compared architectures. This characteristic, even if it comes at a cost in latency, led
us to select the SBM as the multiplier of choice for comparing all lattice-based candidates
fairly. In order to provide a fair comparison in terms of clock frequency, we make use of
500MHz as our frequency of choice in the experiments that follow1.
We have presented the implementation results using SBM multiplier for each identified
operand size in Table 8. The implemented SBM multiplier takes two inputs OP1 and
OP2 with corresponding size m and n bits, respectively. It results in a product with size
s = m+ n − 1 bits. Therefore, it is essential to perform reduction to achieve a product
length that matches the input length.
One approach to perform reduction is to perform bitwise XOR operation over first m
bits of s with cyclic shifts to left on the remaining n bits of s, one by one. This process
can be repeated until all n bits of s are processed. This approach is a good fit for use
in conjunction with the SBM multiplier since it already implements a shifter of size s.
Thus, a unified architecture for reduction and multiplication can be sought. While we have
previously said that the SBM multiplier takes m-1 cycles, a unified multiplication/reduction
unit takes 2(m-1) cycles to compute.
Our results for the implemented multipliers are shown in Table 8, where the first
1Synthesis is performed with high area and power effort on 65nm technology
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column shows the name of the particular algorithm and the length of input operands in
parentheses (i.e., OP1 × OP2). The number of combinational and the sequential cells are
provided in the second and third column of Table 8, respectively. The reported area (in
mm2) is provided in the fourth column. Finally, columns five and six provide the dynamic
power (in µW ) and leakage power (also in µW ) for multiplication operation.
Table 8: Implementation results for SBM multiplier using a 65nm standard cell library.
Target frequency is 500MHz.
Algorithms
(operand sizes in bits)
Combinational
cells
Sequential
cells
Area
(mm2)
Dynamic
power
(µW)
Leakage
power
(µW)
NTRU-Prime (6088×6088) 435073 12189 0.8389 100510.6 125.3402
NTRU-Prime (12176×6088) 750152 18278 1.4124 144073.8 202.0082
FrodoKEM2 (172032×172032) - 2329421 22.1505 51177810. 629.637
Saber (4096×4096) 206941 8205 0.4599 66433.2 42.4874
NTRU (11216×11216) 821229 22446 1.5602 163509.7 207.3250
ThreeBears (3120×3120) 141422 6252 0.3192 58829.7 30.8762
Round5 (15136×6208) 902623 21358 1.6785 164367.2 230.1910
Crystals-Dilithium (8192×8192) 592155 16398 1.1251 123343.3 139.4685
Crystals-KYBER (3072×3072) 131973 6156 0.3069 51800.5 31.9299
NewHope (16384×16384) 1302689 32783 2.4760 230704.9 446.6865
LAC (8192×8192) 592155 16398 1.1251 123343.3 139.4685
qTesla (16384×16384) 1302689 32783 2.4760 230704.9 446.6865
Falcon (32×32) 1001 70 0.0024 581.5 0.2499
Falcon (24576×24576) 2926129 49167 5.4670 327836.5 1410.9000
As shown in column three of Table 8, the number of flip flops for SBM multiplier are
roughly 2 times the length of input operands. A handful of additional flops are required
for controlling the shift & add operation and for setting its termination condition. The
overall area (in mm2) is reported in column four of Table 8, while power values are given
in in columns five and six.
As summarized, we have achieved the multiplication results using SBM multiplier
architecture by generating partial products for operand lengths as large as 24576×24576
bits (for Falcon algorithm). There are numerous research practices where input sizes are
much more modest. For instance, [37], [39], [40] employ operand sizes as large as 4096 bits.
However, despite the SBM multiplier, we have shown implementation results for operand
size of 4096 bits over 2-Way KM, 3-Way TCM, and 4-Way TCM multipliers, which is
comparable with state-of-the-art implementations [37], [39], [40]. These results are shown
in Appendix A.
4.3 Implementation of identified hash algorithms
The lattice-based NIST PQC candidates use different hash functions with different input
and output lengths. Previously, in Section 3.3 of this work, we have described the required
2The area and power values reported for FrodoKEM are estimated instead of synthesized. Unfortunately
a multiplier of this size is too challenging for synthesis to handle.
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lengths for input and output parameters of identified hash functions. This section deals
with the implementation of identified hash functions. Therefore, we have developed our
own RTL cores in Verilog (HDL) for the identified hash and XOF functions. In one clock
cycle, each developed core takes a 64 bits of a message as an input and results the desired
hash value as an output (as described in Section 3.3). Furthermore, in the developed cores,
Mlength/64 clock cycles are required to read the input message string when Mlength is the
message length. The total number of clock cycles to generate one hash value is depends on
the number of state rounds in the hash and XOF functions. Different number of rounds
are for different hash and XOF functions. However, sum of clock cycles for Mlength/64 and
for number of rounds determines the total clock cycles to generate a hash value over an
arbitrary length of message. For each hash and XOF function, the behavioral simulations
of each developed core is verified by providing an empty “ ” message string as an input
and the resultant hash value achieved in 256 and 512 bits in length is compared with
the corresponding hash values (test vectors for verification’s – provided by the NIST –
available at [41]). The implementation results over 500MHz on commercial 65nm standard
library are provided in Table 9. The name of the NIST PQC candidate is provided in the
first column of Table 9, while the corresponding utilized hash/cipher is shown in column
two. Required area (in µm2) is shown in column three, while columns four and five provide
values for dynamic (in µW ) and leakage power (in µW ), respectively. Finally, we have
used a dash symbol “− ” in Table 9 where neither hash nor AES block cipher is required.
Table 9: Implementation of identified hash algorithms using 65nm standard cell library.
Target frequency is 500MHz.
Algorithms Hash functions Area (mm2)
Dynamic
power (µW)
Leakage
power (µW)
NTRU-Prime SHA2-512 0.0732 18003.4 1.6227
FrodoKEM
AES-128 0.0225 6415.5 0.3062
SHAKE-256 0.1056 18568.4 3.6235
Saber
SHAKE-128 0.1101 19379.2 3.1528
SHA3-256 0.1062 18568.1 4.2955
SHA3-512 0.0984 15927.1 3.2830
NTRU SHA3-256 0.1062 18568.1 4.2955
ThreeBears cSHAKE-256 0.1055 18568.4 3.6235
Round5
cSHAKE-256 0.1055 18568.4 3.6235
AES-256 0.0395 13562.1 0.4472
Crystals-Dilithium
SHAKE-128 0.1103 19649.9 4.4626
SHAKE-256 0.1056 18556.2 3.5285
Crystals-KYBER
AES-256 0.0395 13562.1 0.4472
SHA2-256 0.0362 8881.4 0.4671
SHA2-512 0.0732 18003.4 1.6227
SHAKE-256 0.1055 18568.4 3.6235
NewHope
SHAKE-128 0.1103 19649.9 4.4626
SHAKE-256 0.1055 18555.9 3.4193
LAC – – – –
qTesla
SHAKE-256 0.1056 18568.4 3.6235
cSHAKE-128 0.1103 19649.9 4.4626
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cSHAKE-256 0.1055 18568.4 3.6235
Falcon SHAKE-256 0.1056 18559.8 3.4941
In the text that follows, we describe the hash and XOF functions that we have
implemented in RTL, as well as their parameters. Moreover, an open source RTL core for
AES block cipher is also used in this work and discussed below.
SHA2 cores. The developed cores for SHA2-256 and SHA2-512 generate a hash value
with a 256-bit or 512-bit output, respectively. The internal state length is set to 256 bits
(8×32) for SHA2-256 while for SHA2-512 it is set as 512 bits (8×64). The block sizes
are 512 and 1024 bits, respectively. Finally, the number of required rounds to generate
one hash value are 64 for SHA2-256 and 80 for SHA2-512. The developed RTL core for
SHA2-256 is only used in Crystals-KYBER algorithm. Similarly, the developed RTL core
for SHA2-512 is required in NTRU-Prime and Crystals-KYBER algorithms.
SHA3 cores. The cores for SHA3-256 and SHA3-512 are developed based on the
function keccak[c](M||01, d), where c denotes the capacity (c=512 for SHA3-256 and
c=1024 for SHA3-512), M represents the input message, and d represents the output length
in bits (d=256 for SHA3-256 and d=512 for SHA3-512). In both cores, internal state
length is set to 1600 bits (5×5×64). The used block size for SHA3-256 is 1088 bits and
for SHA3-512 is 576 bits. Finally, to generate the digest message, the number of required
rounds for SHA3-256 and SHA3-512 are 24. The developed core for SHA3-256 is used in
NTRU and Saber algorithms while the SHA3-512 core is only used in Saber algorithm.
SHAKE cores. We have developed two SHAKE cores, namely SHAKE-128 and
SHAKE-256, which are based on the function keccak[c](M||1111, d), where the capacity
c is 256 for SHAKE-128 and 512 for SHAKE-256. The internal state length is set to
1600 bits (5×5×64) for both cores. The blocks size for SHAKE-128 is 1344 bits and
for SHAKE-256 is 1088 bits. To generate the digest message, the number of required
rounds for SHAKE-128 and SHAKE-256 are 24. The SHAKE-128 core is required in
Crystals-Dilithium, Saber, and NewHope algorithms, where the desired output lengths are
256, 768, and 1600 bits, respectively. Similarly, the SHAKE-256 core is used in Falcon,
FrodoKEM, Crystals-Dilithium, Crystals-KYBER, NewHope, and qTesla algorithms. The
output lengths are 64, 1024, 384, 256, 1024 and 256 bits, respectively.
cSHAKE cores. Our cSHAKE-128 and cSHAKE-256 cores are developed based on
the function keccak[c](bytepad(encode_string(N)||encode_string(S), R)||M||00, d), where
the capacity c is 256 for cSHAKE-128 and 512 for cSHAKE-256, N is the function name
bit string, S is the customization bit string, R represents the rate (in bytes). Our cSHAKE
cores use identical lengths for internal state length and block sizes as in the SHAKE
cores. A digest message is also generated after 24 rounds. The cSHAKE-128 core is only
required in qTesla algorithm (output lengths of 256 bits). The cSHAKE-256 core is used
in ThreeBears, Round5, and qTesla algorithms, also with an output length of 256 bits.
AES cores. We have selected an open source RTL core (for 128 and 256 bits) written
in Verilog (HDL) for AES algorithm from reference [42] and [30], respectively. Consequently,
the AES core for 128 bits is required in Frodo-KEM algorithm while the AES core for 256
bits is required in Crystals-KYBER and Round5 algorithms, respectively. The AES core
of [42] for 128 requires 12 clock cycles to perform complete encryption. Similarly, the AES
core mentioned in [30] need 46 clock cycles to achieve desired output.
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5 Evaluation of NIST PQC Algorithms as Hardware Accel-
erators
In this section, we treat the algorithms as accelerators completely described as specialized
hardware – there are no processor/software components. Therefore, for each accelerator, we
provide the aggregated results that take into account all the identified building blocks. Our
results are given for area and power, while the target frequency is set at 500MHz for the
sake of comparison. We emphasize that complete implementations of NIST lattice-based
PQC algorithms are not described in this work for the reason that we have not accounted
for the âĂĲglue logicâĂİ that gives meaning to each algorithm.
Area and power figures for each accelerator are calculated by using Eq. 1 and Eq. 2,
respectively, in which we sum the contributions of each building block3.
Area = area of(
∑
ROM +
∑
RAM +MULT +
∑
HASH) (1)
Power = dynamic power of(
∑
ROM +
∑
RAM +MULT +
∑
HASH) (2)
The aggregate results for area and power are presented in figures 3 and 4, respectively.
We have ordered the algorithms according to their area and power requirements. Therefore,
the algorithm order presented in Fig. 3 does not necessarily match the order in Fig. 4.
It stands out that the multiplier takes most the area resources and contributes the
most to the power consumption. As we described earlier in this work, having large
multipliers is a common requirement for several of the NIST PQC candidates. There are
many multiplier architectures that can be used, including solutions that rely on digitized
computation [40,43]. These multipliers should be adapted to the characteristics of each
algorithm and to the application requirements.
However, to make a fair comparison of the selected algorithms, we have elected to
use only one multiplier in this work. Our main motivation is to provide sufficient details
that can help the security community to select an appropriate algorithm according to the
complexity of targeted application. The information provided in figures 3 and 4 is very
useful in that regard, while also identifying which building block is the best candidate for
being replaced, optimized, or even offloaded elsewhere.
Regarding area, our analysis reveals that ThreeBears is the only accelerator that has an
area requirement below 0.5mm2. Its area is mostly a function of the employed multiplier
while the hashing core utilized requires a fraction of the resources. Memories are barely
a factor. The area consumption of Crystals-KYBER and Saber lies between 0.5mm2 <
area < 0.5mm2. Similarly, the area consumption of LAC, Crystals-Dilithium, and NTRU
lies between 1.0mm2 < area < 2.0mm2. Accelerators such as Round5, NTRU-Prime,
NewHope, qTesla, and Falcon require between 2mm2 and 6mm2 of silicon area. In modern
chip design, IP size is often measured in units of mm2, while the overall chip size can be
measured in tens of mm2. In this sense, the algorithms aforementioned could be considered
in their current form. On the other hand, FrodoKEM is too far above a reasonable size
and would be a perfect candidate for a digitized multiplier architecture. We opt not to
show FrodoKEM in these charts.
As shown in Fig. 4, the highest power consumption comes from the Falcon algorithm.
Keeping the descending order, qTesla is second highest power hungry algorithm. Often,
multiplier contribute high part in the total power consumption of an algorithm, but the
power profile of Crystals-KYBER is completely different as it consumes 112.77mW of
3NTRU-Prime and Falcon employ more than one multiplier. We sum the contributions of both
multipliers for each algorithm. For NTRU-Prime in particular, this might not be the optimal design choice
since both multipliers take at least one input of 6088 bits, meaning that resources can be easily shared.
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Figure 3: Total area of the studied NIST lattice-based PQC algorithms, ordered.
power. Here, the hash core is responsible for approximately 53% of the power consumption
(59.01mW out of 112.77mW ). This power figure could be reduced if the hashing function
was replaced. ThreeBears is least power consumption candidate and it requires power of
79.92mW. Saber, LAC and Crystals-Dilithium accelerators consume power in the range of
100mW to 150mW. The remaining algorithms require the power between 150mW < power
< 400mW and and the power profile of the power look like a exponentially increasing
function – we compare these values with other implementations in the next subsection..
Fig. 4 reveals that the power consumption is tightly linked to the consumption of the
multiplier and the hashing cores. In other words, both RAMs and ROMs have little
bearing on the power budget. The contribution of memories to the accelerator area is
more pronounced, even if the total area is still strongly dominated by the multiplier area.
Regarding frequency of operation, the bottleneck in all of our experiments is always the
multiplier.
5.1 Comparison to state-of-the-art implementations
After providing descriptions and evaluations of critical building blocks of NIST lattice-based
PQC candidates in Section 3 and Section 4, now we have to frame it with respect to
state-of-the-art implementations of lattice-based algorithms in hardware. Moreover, it will
help ASIC designers to select an appropriate algorithm according to the complexity of
targeted application.
As described in Section 1.1, the available literature on NIST lattice-based PQC candi-
dates considers different implementation platforms [20–29]. The implementations described
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Figure 4: Total power consumption of the studied NIST lattice-based PQC algorithms,
ordered.
in [20, 21] are software based and provide no good basis for comparison. Similarly, [22–25]
performed FPGA implementations in an Artix-7 device. ASIC implementations are de-
scribed in [26–29] where different technologies (i.e., 65nm, 40nm, and 28nm) have been
used to draw area and power figures.
Moreover, the results reported in [26,27] use the same 65nm node as we do in our ex-
periments. The authors provide results for Crystals-Kyber, NewHope, FrodoKEM, NTRU,
Saber, Crystals-Dilithium, and qTesla. Except for FrodoKEM, we provide comparisons to
these accelerators in Table 10.
Table 10: Implementation details of NIST lattice-based PQC candidates on 65nm ASIC
technology
Ref. Implementedaccelerator SLi
Clk.
Period
(in ns)
Freq.
(in MHz)
Total area
(in µm2)
Total power
(in mW)
[26]
Crystals-KYBER 1 5.0 200 3378515 39.21
NewHope 1 5.9 168.6 3208999 38.02
NTRU 1 5.8 169.5 1246869 14.30
Saber 3 7.2 137.75 4774529 54.49
Crystals-Dilithium 1 6.3 157.7 4774529 51.24
[27]
qTesla 1 5.0 200 3450765 16.08
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Crystals-Dilithium 1 5.0 200 3677434 11.31
This work (pre-
liminary data for
arXiv version)
Crystals-KYBER 5 5.0 200 159400 (-95%) 83.35 (+53%)
NewHope 5 5.93 168.6 2384120 (-26%) 98.54 (+61%)
NTRU 5 5.89 169.5 1642730 (+31%) 78.85 (+82%)
Saber 5 7.3 137.75 834200 (-83%) 42.14 (-23%)
Crystals-Dilithium 4 6.34 157.7 1153800 (-76%) 54.77 (+6%)
qTesla 3 5.0 200 3408870 (-1%) 181.47 (+91%)
Crystals-Dilithium 4 5 200 1165100 (-68%) 69.41 (+83%)
It is noteworthy that implementations of Crystals-KYBER, Saber, and Crystals-
Dilithium in [26] and [27] require significant more area than our estimation. This can be
partially attributed to the fact that we focus on building blocks and disregard the ‘glue
logic’ between them.
Regarding power, we show comparison values at the bottom of Table 10 for which we
have matched the frequency of operation. Otherwise, our accelerators tend to consume
much more power than their counterparts, which is explained by our much higher frequency
of operation and the additional buffering required to attain this frequency. There is always
a trade-off between clock frequency (performance) and area/power. In this paper, we
opted to target a really challenging clock frequency with the assumption that performance
is paramount.
Furthermore, the authors of [26,27] make use of HLS for generating their RTL code,
which implies the C/C++ routines written for multipliers are operated in a loop fashion
where the input and output parameters are uint16_t/uint32_t/uint64_t. Such solution is
no different than a digitized/segmented multiplier, which should decrease area and power
at the cost of execution time/latency. The use of higher security levels in our work is also
a factor that results in higher hardware resources and power consumption, as shown in
column three of Table 10.
5.2 Limitations of this work
Despite the fact that this paper has assessed lattice-based NIST PQC candidates based on
the strict rules defined in Section 2.1, there are still certain limitations and caveats:
• Table 4 lists many of the identified arithmetic operators, but our analysis focuses on
multiplication as we consider it to be more challenging than other operations. This
is not enough to generate a functional crypto accelerator, but it ought be enough
to capture the characteristics of it. There are various other operators, including
transformations from one domain to another, that are required for a complete
implementation of a lattice-based crypto accelerator.
• For each particular algorithm, there is a number of reference models that target
different security levels. For each studied algorithm, we consider only the reference
model with the highest security level. This approach might be an overkill for several
applications that would otherwise be satisfied with an AES-128 equivalent level of
security.
• Results for area and power are collected after logic synthesis. However, an accelerator
still has to go through physical synthesis, where many additional cells are added and
routing resources have to be accounted for.
• We make assumptions based on reference implementations that were submitted to
NIST for standardization. As the name implies, these are reference implementations
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and may not be optimized on purpose for the sake of readability. Yet, we believe our
approach to extract building blocks remains valid despite this limitation.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have evaluated how lattice-based algorithms participating in the NIST
PQC standardization process would perform as ASIC hardware accelerators. Even if some
candidates had been previously evaluated [22–24, 26], there remained many avenues of
research to explore towards a fair and comprehensive comparison among algorithms. To
achieve this, we have evaluated the C/C++ codes of reference implementations to extract
the relevant information pertaining to this study. Furthermore, based on the extracted
figures, we have compiled and generated 50+ memory instances for ROMs and RAMs with
different parameter sets using a commercial memory compiler. We have also synthesized
dozens of multiplier and hashing cores
From the onset, our goal was to provide ASIC designers with information that can
guide their future implementations of lattice-based crypto cores. In this regard, this work
highlights algorithms that would make for efficient accelerators and which building blocks
could be targeted for further improvement. Nevertheless, there are many aspects that
remain to be studied. In particular, in future works, we aim to investigate the multiplier
design space even further and to implement unified architectures that can share resources
more efficiently.
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Appendix A Area, power, and frequency trends for differ-
ent multipliers
To provide representative trends, we have developed codes in Verilog for several of the
multipliers employed by the reference implementations (see Section 3.2). Next, we per-
formed logic synthesis of the multipliers using a range of operand sizes. The tool utilized
for this experiment is Cadence Genus. The standard cell library is a commercial one and
the process node is 65nm.
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A.1 SBM, 2-Way KM, 3-Way and 4-Way TCM multipliers
We have developed our own codes in RTL form for SBM, 2-Way KM, 3-Way TCM, and
4-Way TCM multipliers, which all take two input operands and produce one single output.
The inputs are identical in size and are given in the form 2n, where n is an integer value
in the range 1 to 12. In these multipliers, the output is considered without any reduction
operation (i.e., the output is 2×(2n)− 1 bits in length). To evaluate the performance of
SBM, 2-Way KM, 3-Way TCM and 4-Way TCM multipliers, we show trends with respect
to input operand sizes in figures 5, 6, and 7.
Figure 5: Required area (in µm2) for different multipliers and sizes
Figure 6: Achieved clock frequency (in GHz) for different multipliers and sizes
As shown in Fig 5, the SBM multiplier utilizes lower hardware resources in terms of
area as compared to its counterparts. The 2-Way KM multiplier utilizes lower hardware
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Figure 7: Total power consumption (in µW ) for different multipliers and sizes
resources than 3-Way and 4-Way TCM multipliers, as expected. When comparing 3-Way
TCM to 4-Way TCM multipliers, the former utilizes lower hardware area than the latter.
Still regarding area increase trends, it can be seen that the SBM, 2-Way KM, 3-Way TCM
and 4-Way TCM multipliers show an exponential increase in size with the operand size.
This is a strong argument in favor of digitized computation.
For different multipliers with diverse operand lengths, the maximum achieved clock
frequency is shown in Fig 6. These values where obtained by performing synthesis runs
repeatedly until the performance could no longer be improved (i.e., the constraints were
pushed iteratively until they were no longer met). Based on the implementation results, it
becomes clear that the 2-Way KM multiplier could be used as an efficient replacement for
3-Way TCM multiplier as it achieves comparable clock frequency while utilizing less area.
For large input sizes, all multipliers outperform SBM since they benefit from breaking
down the problem in chunks. Conversely, the 4-Way TCM presents the highest frequency
in the comparison shown in Fig 6.
Regarding power consumption, as shown in Fig 7, the SBM multiplier outperforms all
other multipliers – this is an important characteristic that influenced our choice of SBM
as the multiplier for the PQC algorithms studied in this paper. When considering the
power consumption of 2-Way KM, 3-Way TCM, and 4-Way TCM multipliers, 4-Way TCM
consumes more power than 2-Way KM and 3-Way TCM multipliers. There is an increase
in power consumption as the length of inputs to the multipliers are increased, as well as
an increase with the number of ’ways’ each multiplier uses.
A.2 NTT multiplier
For the analysis of NTT multipliers, we have adapted the pipeline architecture described
in [39]. Contrary to the previously discussed multipliers, here it makes little sense to
decouple the pipelining from the core idea of the algorithm. In fact, it would be fair to
refer to [39] as a multiplier architecture instead of a simple multiplier implementation.
For this reason, our NTT multiplier analysis is presented separately. We emphasize that
it is a complex architecture, for which the authors carefully selected many parameters
(e.g., polynomial size, residual size, number of parallel units, reduction tables, etc.) when
targeting an FPGA platform.
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After our analysis, and in line with the results of [39], we have found the critical path of
NTT multiplier to be dependent on a 30-bit integer multiplier and the reduction operation
that follows it (i.e., the operation that brings the 60-bit result back to 30 bits). We have
considered multiple pipeline depths (1, 2, 3 and 4) and multiple operand sizes for its integer
multiplier (20, 25, 35, and 40) in our analysis [37]. In Fig 8, we show how the critical path
changes depending on the pipeline depth of the integer multiplier as well as the width of
operands. From our results, it appears that the clock frequency saturates when 3 stages are
used for pipelining, whereas in [39] the implementation makes use of 4 stages. We believe
this difference comes from the FPGA DSP unit that implements the integer multiplier
in [39]. In our analysis, this unit has been replaced by a ChipWare component. For the
sake of providing a basis for comparison to other multipliers, we have evaluated the area
required for the 30-bit/4-stage version of the NTT code, which comes to be 209740 µm2
(approximately 52k cells). However, this result includes many blackboxes for the memory
hierarchy that is required to implement this NTT architecture. These values should not
be directly compared to other multipliers since they are known to be underestimated.
Figure 8: Analysis of NTT multiplier (obtained from [39] and slightly modified for ASIC)
A.3 Summary of the multipliers trend
Due to bit serial structure, the implemented SBM multiplier requires m-1 clock cycles
for m bit operands length. The implemented 2-Way KM, 3-Way TCM, and 4-Way TCM
multiplier require m/2-1, m/3-1, and m/4-1 clock cycles. This reduction comes with a
cost in resources, naturally. Implementation of NTT multiplier requires 2m+2log2n clock
cycles, where n determines the number of NTT points.
The performance of the evaluated multipliers could be improved significantly by using
different optimization techniques, most notably pipelining and digitizing. However, in these
plots (Fig. 5–7), we have not provided optimized results either for pipelining or digitizing,
as we are interested in showing trends that capture the core idea of each algorithm.
Consequently, there is always a trade-off when selecting an appropriate multiplier and
evaluating its area, frequency, and power characteristics. In this work, the SBM multiplier
was deemed more appropriate due, its flexibility, its lower area footprint, and its lower
power consumption (with respect to the other multipliers we considered).
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Finally, regarding NTT-based multipliers, while it appears tremendously advanta-
geous, generating a single NTT multiplier architecture that would be a good fit for all
NIST candidates is not feasible. The parameter space requires careful algorithm-specific
exploration.
